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Provocative
By choosing
the word, “apartheid” in the subtitle of his new book, Palestine:
Peace Not Apartheid, former President Jimmy Carter creates controversy
before the book’s cover is opened. While the book is about Palestine, the
elephant in the room is Israel, and Carter pulls no punches in calling
attention to the many ways in which the state of Israel has failed to live up
to its agreements. Thanks to Carter’s patient narration in this book, readers
can listen to another call for peace in this troubled region and understand
the specific ways in which it could be achieved. Here’s an excerpt, from the
beginning of Chapter 3, “My Presidency: 1977-81,” pp. 37-41:
The 1973
war introduced major changes in the character of the Middle
East. The effective performance of the Egyptian and Syrian
armies increased the stature of both President Ariwar
al-Sadat of Egypt and
President Hafez alAssad of Syria. The Arab states
demonstrated that they were willing to use oil as a weapon in support of Arab
interests, through embargo and price increases. In Israel, in June 1974, Prime
Minister Golda Meir resigned and Yitzhak Rabin took
her place. Also, in October, Arab leaders unanimously proclaimed the
Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people, with Yasir Arafat as its
leader. Now the Palestinians were to be seen as a people who could speak for
themselves.
The PLO
became a powerful political entity, able to arouse strong support in
international forums from the Arabs, the Soviet Union, most Third
World countries, and many others. However, U.S. government leaders pledged not to
recognize or negotiate with the PLO until the organization officially
acknowledged Israel’s
right to exist and accepted U.N. Resolution 242, which confirmed Israel’s
existence within its 1949 borders. A more important problem was that the
PLO’s rejection of Israel
was shared by the leaders of all Arab nations, following four wars in the
previous twenty-five years.
These were
the events that I monitored after returning home from my first visit to Israel
and during my race for president. It was a rare day on the campaign trail
that I did not receive questions from Jewish citizens about the interests of
Israel,
and my growing team of issue analysts provided me with briefing papers that
I could study. I made repeated promises that I would seek to invigorate the
dormant peace effort, and after I was elected and before my inauguration I
made a speech at the Smithsonian Institution in which I listed this as a
major foreign policy goal.
Since the United States
had to play a strong role in any peace effort, I reviewed the official
positions of my predecessors on the key issues. Our nation’s constant policy
had been predicated on a few key United Nations Security Council resolutions,
notably 242 of 1967 (Appendix 1) and 338 of 1973 (Appendix 2). Approved
unanimously and still applicable, their basic premise is that Israel’s
acquisition of territory by force is illegal and that Israel must withdraw
from occupied territories; that Israel has the right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries; that the refugee problem must be settled;
and that the international community should assist with negotiations to
achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East. More specifically, U.S. policy was that Israeli settlements in
the West Bank and Gaza
were “illegal and obstacles to peace.” One of my first and most controversial
public statements came in March 1977, just a few weeks after I became
president, when I reviewed these same premises and added, “There has to be a
homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many,
many years.” This would be the first move toward supporting a Palestinian
state.
Two weeks
later, President Sadat came to Washington for a state visit, and after
the official banquet he and I went upstairs to the living quarters in the
‘White House. During a long, private conversation it became obvious that his
inclination to work with me on peace negotiations was already well developed,
but he had not decided on any firm plan to reach what might become our common
goal. Sadat told me plainly that he was willing to
take bold steps toward peace, all of them based on the prevailing U.N.
Security Council resolutions. We discussed some of the specific elements of
possible direct negotiations in the future: Israel’s
permanent boundaries, the status of Jerusalem,
Palestinian rights, and—almost inconceivable at the time—free trade and open
borders between the two nations, plus full diplomatic recognition and the
exchange of ambassadors.
Menachem Begin replaced
Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister a month later, and I quickly learned all I
could about Israel’s
new leader. His surprising victory ended the uninterrupted domination of the
Labor Party since Israel’s
independence. Begin had put together a majority coalition that accepted his
premise that the land in Gaza
and the \Vest Bank belonged rightfully to the State of Israel and should not
be exchanged for a permanent peace agreement with the Arabs. Public opinion
varied widely, but there was no doubt in 1977 that a more hawkish attitude
now prevailed in the government of Israel. I was deeply concerned
but sent him personal congratulations and an invitation to visit me in Washington.
Although
many factors had influenced the outcome of the Israeli election, age and
ethnic differences strongly favored the Likud over
the Labor alignment. Oriental Jews (known as Sephardim), whose families had
come from the Middle East and Africa, gave the Likud
coalition parties a political margin in 1977, and they were inclined to
support a much more militant policy in dealing with the occupied territories.
Although Begin was not one of them by birth, his philosophy and demeanor were
attractive to the Sephardic voters. Also, the Sephardim were generally
younger, more conservative, and nearer the bottom of the economic ladder and
they resented the more prosperous and sophisticated Jewish immigrants from
Europe and America (known
as Ashkenazim), who had furnished almost all of Israel’s previous leaders. The
Sephardic families had a higher birth rate than the Ashkenazim, and now,
combined with many immigrants, they had become a strong political force.
The
personal character of Menachem Begin was also a
major factor in the victory. After he and his family suffered persecution in
Eastern Europe and Siberia for his political activity as a Zionist, he was
released from a Soviet prison and went to Palestine in 1942. He became the leader of
a militant underground group called the Irgun,
which espoused the maximum demands of Zionism. These included driving
British forces out of Palestine.
He fought with every weapon available against the British, who branded him as
the preeminent terrorist in the region. A man of personal courage and
single-minded devotion to his goals, he took pride in being a “fighting Jew.”
I realized that Israel’s
new prime minister, with whom I would be dealing, would be prepared to resort
to extreme measures to achieve the goals in which he believed.
Palestine:
Peace Not Apartheid, brings readers a three decade perspective on the
topic of peace between Israel
and its neighbors, and reveals the blueprint that has been in place for a
long time on how peace could be achieved.
Steve Hopkins,
March 23, 2007
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