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On the Brink
Prominent historian John Lucaks presents a
compelling case in his book, Five Days
in London: May 1940. Had England
chosen to stop fighting Hitler then, an option very close to implementation
during the end of May, 1940, Western Civilization would have been transformed
by Hitler’s National Socialism, the greatest threat it ever faced. Lucaks
recounts how Churchill transformed the defeatist and appeasement elements of
his government during these five critical days. Using sources recently made
available, Lucaks recounts the events of these critical days from multiple
perspectives. Here’s an excerpt from the beginning of chapter 4, “Sunday, 26 May,” pp. 104-113:
An agitated day. — Three meetings of the War Cabinet. — Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill. — Disagreements between Halifax and
Churchill. —Scarcity of
news: “A mandate to delay judgment and not to worry.” — “In Westminster Abbey.”
A gloomy day, in more than one way:
for the first time in many a day it rained.
In
early April there had been some talk of a National Day of Prayer. The
archbishop of Canterbury
had thought it inadvisable because
it could be misinterpreted.
Now, along with all the churches, he endorsed it. The king had spoken of it in his broadcast of 23
May.[i]
So had the newspapers. “Let Us Pray” was an article on the front page of the Daily
Express on Saturday: “It must mean something tomorrow?” At ten o’clock on
Sunday morning the king, the queen, and the highest personages of the empire
arrived in Westminster Abbey. The king and queen carried gas masks.
Wilhelmina, queen of the Netherlands,
came with them. Someone shouted: “Long live the Netherlands!” Wilhelmina dropped
a curtsey. There was a long queue outside. Churchill made it clear to his household that he
and Mrs. Churchill would be able to attend for no longer than ten to thirty
minutes. Indeed they left early, in the middle of the service, for there was
plenty for him to do.
The
events of this grave Sunday were so many and complicated that, before their
reconstruction and analysis, their sequence ought to be sorted out and summed
up briefly. We have seen that Churchill requested a meeting of the War
Cabinet at the unusual hour of 9 A.M.
on this Sunday. One hour later came the high service in Westminster
Abbey. Meanwhile, Reynaud and a French delegation arrived in London. At noon Halifax saw the Italian ambassador again.
Then he lunched with Chamberlain. Churchill had a long lunch with Reynaud in
Admiralty House. He returned to 10
Downing Street for another cabinet at 2 P.M. After about forty minutes
Churchill asked Halifax
to go over to Admiralty House to meet with Reynaud. Churchill, Chamberlain,
and Greenwood
followed him twenty or so minutes later. A few minutes after four o’clock
Reynaud left for France.
The War Cabinet members stayed. There was an-other cabinet meeting in
Admiralty House at five o’clock, ending at half past six. At eight Churchill
dined with Ismay and Eden.
The
War Cabinet session at 9 A.M. began
with Churchill’s account of the situation with the French and with the
Belgians. He had a letter from his personal representative in Paris, General
Edward Spears — all bad news
about France and the French. The king of Belgium was making ready to
capitulate. Churchill’s envoy to the king, Sir Roger Keyes, had sent a
telegram whose essence was that “King Leopold had written to King George VI
to explain his motive in remaining with his army and people if the Belgian
Army became encircled and the capitulation of the Belgian Army became
inevitable?”
The
gist of all this was summed up by Churchill: “It seems from all the evidence
available that we might have to face a situation in which the French were
going to collapse, and that we must do our best to extricate the British
Expeditionary Force from northern France?”
Then
Churchill played an important card. A few days before he had asked the chiefs
of staff “to consider the situation which would arise if the French would
drop out of the war?”
In the event of France being unable to
continue in the war and becoming neutral, with the Germans holding their
present position and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after
assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of
terms offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of
Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc.;
what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and
probably Italy. Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of
preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island
cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000
men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be
very dangerous for Germany
engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe.
The
answer of the chiefs of staff has since become a historic document of first
importance, well known to students of the period. Entitled “British Strategy
in a Certain Eventuality:” it was a long paper.[ii]
It presumed the worst possible conditions — and, by 25 May, an increasingly plausible
situation: the French making peace with Germany, Italy entering the war,
Europe and French North Africa under German control, and the loss of most of
the British Expeditionary Force still struggling in northern France and Belgium.
Still — even in these
conditions Britain could
hold out, if the United States would support Britain increasingly, eventually entering the
war, and if the Royal Air Force, together with the navy, would remain
in control over Britain
and thus “prevent Germany
from carrying out a serious sea-borne invasion of this country?” In this they
were to be proved right. The rest of the document dealt with the question of
whether Germany
could be ultimately defeated. On 25 May
this could not be even remotely envisaged. The chiefs of staff assumed that Germany’s
economic situation was to be plagued by shortages of raw materials. Together
with air attacks and revolts in the occupied countries, Germany could
be defeated — at some time in
the future, and with American help. In this assessment the chiefs of staff
were wrong rather than right. They— much like Attlee and Greenwood
in the War Cabinet, and to a considerable extent Chamberlain, too — not only overestimated but were
altogether mistaken about the economic “factors” handicapping Germany.[iii]
But that is not our concern here. The crux was “the immediate problem
[of] . . . how to get
through the next few months, with the Germans across the Channel and no
effective allies. On this the Chiefs of Staff offered a reasoned case for
hope?”[iv]
We
must, however, consider that on this Sunday, one so closely packed with
dramatic events, the War Cabinet members did not have the time to peruse this
long document in detail. And before copies of this secret paper were
circulated, there occurred the first open clash of opinion between Halifax
and Churchill.
Halifax
said that “in the dark picture which had been presented there was one
brighter spot in that the dispute on the rights and wrongs of Lord Gort’s
action in drawing back had now been satisfactorily cleared up and there
would be no recriminations on that point?” Then he came to “the broader
issue. We had to face the fact that it was not so much now a question of
imposing a complete defeat upon Germany
but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible that
of France?”
“In
this connection:” he told the cabinet about his interview with the Italian
ambassador the night before, “Signor Bastianini had clearly made soundings as
to the prospect of our agreeing to a conference. The Ambassador had said
that Signor Mussolini”s principal wish was to secure peace in Europe?” He (Halifax) “had replied that peace and
security in Europe were equally our main
object, and we should naturally be prepared to consider any proposals which
might lead to this, provided our liberty and independence were assured. The
French had been informed of this approach by the Italian Ambassador. Signor
Bastianini had asked for a further interview this morning, and he might have
fresh proposals to put forward?”
Churchill said that
peace and security would not be achieved under a German domination of Europe: “That we could never accept. We must ensure our
complete liberty and independence. He was opposed to any negotiations which
might lead to a derogation of our rights and power?”
Chamberlain
now said that he “thought it very probable that Italy
might send an ultimatum to France
very shortly, saying that unless she would agree to a conference, Italy would come in on Germany’s
side. This would bring very heavy pressure to bear on the French?” There
followed some confusing talk about Italy. Attlee “thought that
Mussolini would be very nervous of Germany
emerging as the predominant power in Europe?”
(This was not so.) Attlee added that he had not yet read the papers of the
chiefs of staff “as to our prospects of holding out if the French collapsed?”
Halifax made
a somewhat obscure statement. He pointed out that if the French intended to
come to terms, “they had a very strong card to play if they made it clear to
Hitler that they were bound not to make a separate peace?” (Why?) “They might
use this as a powerful lever to obtain favourable terms which might be of
great value to us, if it was Hitler’s object to break the alliance?”
At
that moment copies of another paper by the chiefs of staff were handed to the
members of the cabinet about the prospects of Britain going on with the war
single-handed. “It had been drawn up simply for the purpose of providing
arguments to deter the French from capitulating and to strengthen their will
to continue to fight?”[v]
Chamberlain thought that Italy
was important. “Was it possible to ask the French whether Italy could
be bought off? This might at least keep matters going?” Churchill “agreed
that this point was worth bearing in mind?” Halifax then said that, from
reading the chiefs of staffs” paper, he gathered that the entire issue “of
our ability to carry on the war single-handed against Germany would depend on
the main on our being able to establish and maintain air superiority over the
Germans?”
The
chief of the air staff, who was present throughout the meeting, said that
the issue was “not our obtaining air superiority over the Germans, but on our
preventing the Germans from achieving such air superiority as would enable
them to invade this country?” There was some discussion of this, with Halifax suggesting that once France collapsed the Germans
would “no longer need large land forces. They would be free to switch the
balk of their effort to air production?” He also “suggested that in the last
resort we should ask the French to put their factories out of gear?”
Chamberlain must have felt that this was nugatory: “Whatever undertakings of
this character we might extract from the French would be worthless, since the
terms of peace which the Germans would propose would inevitably prevent their
fulfilment?” Churchill “agreed. It was to be expected, however, that the
Germans would make the terms of any peace offer as attractive as possible to
the French, but lay emphasis on the fact that their quarrel was not with France but with England?”[vi]
Then
he asked the War Cabinet to convene again at 2 P.M., after his lunch with Reynaud. They adjourned, Churchill
and Chamberlain hurrying to Westminster Abbey. Halifax went back to the Foreign Office,
where Bastianini came to see him. Cadogan, who was present, wrote in his
diary: “Nothing to be got out of [Bastianini]. He’s an ass — and a timid one at that?”[vii]
Then Halifax
had a quick lunch with Chamberlain.
Churchill
had a long lunch with Reynaud at Admiralty House. Reynaud was constrained to
present Churchill with a general view of the near hopelessness of the French
military situation, largely in accord with what Weygand and Pétain had
insisted upon in their high council the night before. Churchill said that Britain would
go on alone. “We would rather go down fighting than be enslaved to Germany?” Yet
underlying their discussion, which was not unfriendly — Reynaud, who was an Anglophile,
respected and admired Churchill — was
an understanding that their governments were divided. This, of course, was
less so with the British than with the French. Reynaud “had hinted that he
himself would not sign peace terms imposed upon France, but that he might be
forced to resign, or might feel he ought to resign” — which eventually came about, three
weeks to the day. Churchill knew about Weygand and Pétain, though he was not
yet fully aware of the defeatism of the former. Nor was he quite aware of
what other members of the French delegation had sensed, or had pretended to
sense. Colonel Villelume was Reynaud’s principal military aide. That evening
he wrote in his diary, “Halifax.
.
. shows his understanding;
Churchill, prisoner of his habit of blustering, was absolutely negative?”[viii]
At 2 P.M. the War Cabinet convened again. Churchill gave a lengthy
and rather precise account of what Reynaud had said and what he had told
Reynaud. He then suggested that Halifax
go over and see Reynaud, who was still at Admiralty House; Churchill,
Chamberlain, and Attlee would follow a few minutes later. Halifax would talk with Reynaud about the
chances of buying off Mussolini. Did Churchill wish to avoid Halifax, since the latter might state his
case before the others in the War Cabinet? We cannot tell. And Halifax did not leave
yet. “A short further discussion ensued whether we should make any approach
to Italy?”
Halifax “favoured this course, and thought
that the last thing that Signor Mussolini wanted was to see Herr Hitler
dominating Europe. He would be anxious, if
he could, to persuade Herr Hitler to take a more reasonable attitude?”
Churchill “doubted whether anything would come of an approach to Italy, but
said that the matter was one which the War Cabinet would have to consider?”
The open disagreement between
Halifax and Churchill had now become evident. Halifax
no longer wished merely to state his views; now he wanted to extract a
commitment from Churchill: “We had to face the fact that it was not so much
now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany but of safeguarding the
independence of our Empire. . . . We
should naturally be prepared to consider any proposals which might lead to
this, provided our liberty and independence were assured. . . . If he [Churchill] was satisfied that
matters vital to the independence of this country were unaffected” would he
be “prepared to discuss such terms?”
At
this juncture Churchill knew that he could not answer with a categorical no.
He said that he “would be thankful to get out of our present difficulties on
such terms, provided we retained the essentials and the elements of our vital
strength, even at the cost of some territory” — an extraordinary admission (my italics).[ix]
He then added that he did
not believe in the prospect of such a deal. Chamberlain did not say much.
Then with Churchill and Greenwood
he departed to Admiralty House to join Halifax and Reynaud, who were
discussing the approach to Mussolini. Reynaud left after four o’clock.
Churchill
now asked the War Cabinet to stay on in Admiralty House. The record of this
day’s third, fairly dramatic meeting of the War Cabinet is preceded by two
significantly cryptic notes: “After M. Reynaud’s departure, an informal
Meeting of War Cabinet Ministers was held in Admiralty House?” (Why
“informal”?) Also, perhaps more significantly: “This record does not cover
the first quarter of an hour of the discussion, during which the Secretary
[Sir Edward Bridges] was not present?”[x]
Such conditions of secrecy had no precedent in the modern history of Britain. Then
the Secretary came in and Churchill began.
It’s
rare for me to pull back from currently published books to pick up something
I missed when it first came out. An Executive Times reader,
who’s probably read everything written about Churchill asked me if I had read
Lucaks. I mentioned The Duel,
which I enjoyed, and he recommended Five Days
in London. I’m pleased he did. Lucaks presents history with clarity and
informed judgment. Readers may disagree that these five days saved Western
Civilization, but reading why Lucaks feels this way is well worth your time.
Steve
Hopkins, April 23, 2004
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